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considerations involved, the United States Supreme Court may in
the exercise of its proper jurisdiction take action in this area. Probably the only practical, immediate solution would be for the Court
to lay down standards of action for the states in regard to this
problem.
A case was recently decided which presented to the Court the important issues involved in interstate recognition of child custody
decrees.3 4 However, these "difficult and important questions of constitutional law "' 3 5 were expressly left unanswered. Thus the confusion continues. The Court should have welcomed this opportunity
to decide the applicability of the full faith and credit clause to child
custody decrees, thereby eliminating much of the confusion which has
arisen because of the competing policies of the states.
ROBERT

J.

BOYLSTON

RACIAL RESTRICTIONS IN LEASEHOLDS
Prior to 1948 there was no proved constitutional basis upon which
to sustain an attack on restrictive covenants,' the primary means by
which Negroes and other minority groups were excluded from the
purchase or use of real property.2 The United States Supreme Court
had recognized the validity and enforceability 3 of such restrictions in a
series of decisions that served as a bulwark against attacks on the ex4
isting, strongly established racial patterns in urban areas.
The more recent decisions in the civil rights area show that the
federal judiciary has withdrawn many constitutional sanctions upon
which racial discrimination might rest. In the field of education the
federal judiciary has undertaken to abolish discrimination. 5 There
may be some question as to what the pronouncements of the Supreme
34Kovacs v. Brewer, 78 Sup. Ct. 963 (1958).
351d. at 966.

'Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), 1 U. FLA. L. REV. 453.
2See ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 217-26 (1955).
3Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
4ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 217-26 (1955), contains a detailed study of the
development of these patterns.
5See Cooper v. Aaron, 78 Sup. Ct. 1401 (1958); Brown v. Board of Education,
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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Court portend for other areas less affected by a public interest.
Although some jurisdictions held many years ago that "a restriction on alienation to an entire race of people, when appended to a
fee simple estate is void as wholly incompatible with complete ownership," 6 the decisive blow to discrimination in housing was Shelley v.
Kraemer.7 In this case the United States Supreme Court declared
that covenants restricting the use of property to or from particular
races could not be enforced by state action. It stated that action by
the judiciary to enforce private agreements is within the concept of
"state action." The next pronouncement by the Supreme Court was
in Barrows v. Jackson," in which the majority held: "The action of
a state court at law to sanction the validity of the restrictive covenant
here involved would constitute state action as surely as it was state
action to enforce such covenants in equity, as in Shelley . . . ." In
neither of these cases did the Court go so far as to find these covenants
illegal. It merely held them unenforceable. The Court avoided the
broader issues of segregation in housing, such as the effect of discrimination in rental property.10
The federal courts have refrained thus far from ruling that racial
restrictions by individuals are constitutionally illegal per se. Dictum
in the Shelley case indicates that at least some respect remains for
the property owner's right to do with his property as he chooses. The
holding of the Shelley case was only that the enforcement of restrictive covenants by "state action" would be in violation of the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution.
There is only one case" which discusses extensively the problem of
a special limitation restricting the use of an estate to or from a particular race. The North Carolina Supreme Court, in a declaratory
judgment, held that the declaration that upon the use of
property by Negroes in violation of the condition the land would
revert to the grantor did not constitute judicial enforcement by the
state courts within the meaning of Shelley v. Kraemer. Here the
court characterized the grantee's interest as a "fee determinable upon

6See White v. White, 108 W. Va. 128, 147, 150 S.E.2d 531, 539 (1929).
7334 U.S. 1 (1948).
8346 U.S. 249 (1953).
DId. at 254.
loSee Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
"Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 811, 88
S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956).
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special limitations,'1 leaving in the grantor a possibility of reverter.
In the penumbra of these developments in the area of racial discrimination in freehold estates lie two related problems involving
leaseholds: (1) racial discrimination by a purely private landlord,
and (2) restrictions in a lease which prohibit subleasing to a particular racial group. It is with these problems that this note is primarily concerned.
LANDLORD'S RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE

The present state of the law indicates that a private landlord may
discriminate at will against his tenants, provided that the conditions
he imposes are not unreasonable or contrary to public policy. 13 But

once it is established that a landlord is not a private landlord, it
has been held that he cannot discriminate against potential tenants,
but must
14 guarantee them equal opportunity to rent the existing facilities.

In Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp.15 the New York Court of
Appeals affirmed the right of a private landlord to discriminate and
held that public aid such as eminent domain and tax exemption
granted the landlord did not constitute such "state action" as to bring
it under the rule of the Shelley case. In the Dorsey case the landlord refused to rent to Negroes. There was no question of enforcement
of the terms of a lease. If such an issue had been raised, the situation
might be considered analogous to the Shelley case. In the Dorsey
case, the controversy centered around the question of whether the
landlord, having received certain state aid, was still a private landlord. The United States Supreme Court refused certiorari, although
two justices wished to hear the case.
If a particular lessor qualifies as a private landlord, it has been
held that he may exclude children's and pets,17 and that he may re12242 N.C. at 321, 88 S.E.2d at 123.

13See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp.,
299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950). As to the
lack of authority to support this proposition, see Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 153, 155
(1950).
14Shelley v. Kraemer, supra note 13; Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., supra

note 13.
15299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
16Lamont Bldg. Co. v. Court, 66 N.E.2d 552 (Ohio Ct. App.), rev'd, 147 Ohio
St. 183, 70 N.E.2d 447 (1946).
'7Barnard v. Hollingsworth, 336 111. App. 228, 83 N.E.2d 372 (1948); First
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fuse to rent to or to permit the occupancy of his premises by persons
of a particular race, religion, or political affiliation' s A private landlord who had obtained an FHA construction mortgage was permitted
to refuse renewal of a lease to a tenant who had actively attempted
to prevent rent increases.10 In that case, the court characterized as
absolute the landlord's right under the law to choose his tenants.
Seemingly, the only limitation that has been imposed on the right
of landlords to determine their rental policy as they see fit is the
20
consideration of public policy. In Lamont Building Co. v. Court,
which dealt with the validity of a covenant restricting occupancy to
adults, the majority of the Ohio Supreme Court in a four-to-three
decision, referring to "public policy" as "an uncertain and indefinite
term," 2' refused to nullify the restriction. They noted, however, that
if there were a clear-cut statutory pronouncement of public policy
against discrimination in housing, the court might apply it. Three
justices voted to affirm the lower court, which held the covenant
contrary to public policy.
Public policy, as it affects discrimination in housing, has been
defined by the legislatures of several jurisdictions.22 New York has
passed a statute23 designed to remedy the Dorsey situation by prohibiting discrimination in publicly assisted, multiple housing, which
by definition includes property on which loans are guaranteed by any
government agency. 24 Also, on December 30, 1957, the City of New
York enacted an ordinance 25 to prohibit discrimination in certain
private housing accomodations and declared that it was "the policy
Mortgage Bond Co. v. Saxton, 312 Mich. 520, 20 N.W.2d 294 (1945); Annot., 18
A.L.R.2d 880 (1951).
ISHousing Authority v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App.2d 883, 279 P.2d 215 (1955).
19Globerman v. Grand Central Parkway Gardens, 115 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct.
1952), aff'd mem., 281 App. Div. 820, 118 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1st Dep't 1953).
20147 Ohio St. 183, 70 N.E.2d 447 (1946).
221d. at 185, 70 N.E.2d at 448.
22ABRAzs, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 259 (1955), lists states and cities which have
passed some kind of anti-discrimination housing legislation: Conn., Ill., Ind., Mass.,
Minn., N.J., N.Y., Pa., Wis.; Cincinnati, Cleveland, Hartford, Los Angeles, San
Francisco, Toledo.
23N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§18-a to -e. Its constitutionality was upheld in
New York State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apts., Inc., 10
Misc. 334, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
24N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §18-b.
25NEv YORK, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE c. 41, §1, tit. X, reported in 3 RACE
RL. L. REP. 92 (1958). The city's Commission on Intergroup Relations announced
an enforcement policy April 1, 1958, 3 RAcE REL. L. REP. 566 (1958).
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of the city to assure equal opportunity to all residents to live in
decent, sanitary and healthful living quarters, regardless of race, color,
national origin or ancestry, in order that the peace, health, safety and
general welfare of all the inhabitants of the city may be protected and
insured." The law went into effect April 1, 1958, and thus far there
has been no reported litigation. When a law such as this is upheld,
restrictive leases will fall - not before the equal protection clause of
the Constitution but rather before the public policy of the state.
In some states, public policy may be intended to promote segregation,26 and, in the absence of state or federal funds, the landlord
appears to be free to discriminate at will. When the existence of a
definite public policy is questionable, the landlord appears free to
follow his own prejudices.
Finally, even when there is a legal remedy provided for such discrimination, either because a landlord has received public aid, or
there has been a clear and definite pronouncement of public policy
27
against discrimination, it may be difficult to sustain a cause of action.
There are problems of proof as to what constitutes a violation. 28 In
addition, a state may contest residential integration by numerous ad29
ministrative and other devices.

RESTRICTIONS ON SUBLEASING

There is no case law on the question of whether a property owner
who wishes to lease his land for a term of years may insert a valid
condition which will prohibit the use of the property by a particular
minority group. However, it seems that restrictions might be set up
which would not violate any of the recent constitutional pronounce0
ments of the Supreme Court.
Traditionally, the courts have held that landlords have a right to
26Wyatt v. Adair, 215 Ala. 363, 110 So. 801

(1926)

(implied covenant not to

rent to Negroes); cf. Ocean Beach Improvement Co. v. Jenkins, 142 Fla. 273, 194
So. 787 (1940) (Florida indicates a less severe policy).
27Heyward v. Public Housing Adm'n, 135 F. Supp. 217 (S.D. Ga. 1955), modified,
238 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1956), trial on issues, 154 F. Supp. 589 (S.D. Ga. 1957);
West v. Housing Authority, 211 Ga. 133, 84 S.E.2d 30 (1954).
2sSee McKinley Park Homes v. Commission on Civil Rights, 20 Conn. Supp. 169,
129 A.2d 235 (Super. Ct. 1956).
29ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 224-25 (1955), sets out some of these devices.
3
OBarrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 1
U. FLA. L. REV. 453 (1948).
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select their tenants as they see fit.3 1 This has been considered a part
of the property rights incident to ownership of real estate. A landlord may also place reasonable conditions in a lease which if violated
will entitle him to possession of the property. 32 Whether racial restrictions in such a lease would be considered reasonable conditions
within the meaning of the traditional doctrine remains unsettled.
Furthermore, if the landlord must go into court to enforce such a
clause and to evict the tenant, does this come under the broad definition of "state action" which the Court used in the Shelley case?
This difficulty could be avoided by employing a lease which would
terminate upon the occurrence of the particular condition the landlord seeks to prevent. The problem of restraint on alienation would
be avoided, since the lessee would have only a term of years and the
lessor would retain the fee, which would be freely alienable.
The second problem is that of enforcing such a condition when
it is part of a lease. The United States Supreme Court has prohibited
the use of "state action," which it defined for the purpose of the
fourteenth amendment as referring to "exertions of state power in all
forms," 3 3 including the enforcement of private agreements by the

judiciary. The condition should be set up in such form as to avoid
this ruling if it should be held applicable to a lease. It is important,
then, to distinguish between a term of years on a special limitation,
analogous to a base, qualified, or determinable fee, and a term on a
condition subsequent, analogous to a fee simple on a condition subsequent.34 In a base fee, the grantor has a possibility of reverter; in
a fee simple on a condition subsequent, a right of entry.3 5
Although the Court used broad language in the Shelley case, the
condition was declared not illegal per se but merely unenforceable. 36
If a lease should contain a term of years subject to a right of entry on
condition subsequent, the question of the status of the land after
breach of the condition would be raised. A right of entry for a condition broken is not self-executing. The landlord could recover possession after a breach of the condition only by court action, which
would constitute enforcement by the state. However, the North
3'See note 13 supra.
32See I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §3.40 (Casner ed. 1952).
33Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
34See SIMES, FUTURE INTERSs §§12, 13 (1956).
3S5bid.

30334 U.S. at 20; see Wade, Legal Status of Property Transferred Under an
Illegal Transaction,41 ILL. L. REv. 487 (1946).
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Carolina case 37 previously discussed indicates that the contrary is
true of a base fee.
The arrangement which seems most likely to be sustained is a
term of years on a special limitation. Such a lease might provide "to
X for 99 years so long as the property is used by persons of the white
race only," or "to X for 99 years until the property is used by a person
of the Negro race." This would probably effect restriction of the
property for as long as the lessor desired. It couples the self-termination feature of a special limitation with the traditional principle that
the property owner may deal with his property as he pleases in the
absence of statute.
CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, this is a problem involving the conflict between property rights and civil rights. The courts have not yet chosen
to declare restrictive covenants unlawful per se, but merely unenforceable. Thus, by implication, the owner may still discriminate at
will, as long as he does not solicit state action.
The recent holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States
demonstrate that the end has come to judicial recognition of the
"separate but equal" doctrine. State or federal aid to the landlord
may be construed as state action within the meaning of Shelley v.
Kraemer, and the owner who is receiving public aid may, under the
more recent cases, be prohibited from discriminatory practices. The
Supreme Court, however, did not see fit to apply this reasoning in
Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., the leading case in the area. This,
however, may not be a predictable precedent, although it shows that
the Court is, as yet, unwilling to declare the existence of a right to
rent, use, or occupy property without discrimination. If the New
York City ordinance is upheld in future litigation against the contention that it deprives owners of property without due process of
law, the door may be opened for attacking racial discrimination in
leased housing.
Segregation in private housing is not at an end. The courts are
unwilling at this time to attack previously inviolate property rights
of the landlord and declare that there is a civil right to acquire any
property or interest in property without discrimination. The fur37Charlotte Park and Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d
114 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956).
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